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Abstract 
 
Through combining insights from political economy and sociology, this article 
explains the early genesis of the policy notion of governance in relation to ideological 
changes in capitalism. Such an approach has tended to be neglected in existing 
conceptual histories, in the process, undermining a sharper politicisation of the term 
and how it became normalised. The argument dissects how the emergence of 
governance can be understood in light of a relationship between political crises, social 
critique, and justificatory arguments (centred around security and justice claims) that 
form part of an ideological ‘spirit of capitalism’. Through a distinctive comparison 
between the creation of ‘corporate governance’ in the 1970s and the formulation of a 
‘governance agenda’ by the World Bank from the 1980s, the article elucidates how 
the concept, within certain policy uses, but by no means all, can reflect and help 
constitute a neoliberal spirit of capitalism.  
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There are few more challenging and enduring problems within critical theorising than 
explaining why the common sense makes political sense. To reconstruct the genesis 
of the everyday opinion can be at once intimately recognisable and strangely 
perplexing, above all because what passes as the conventional wisdom does not 
always appear as a problem. Clichés, commonplaces, and hackneyed expressions 
often circulate smoothly and rapidly. Gustave Flaubert, the nineteenth-century 
novelist who devoted considerable attention to the concept of authenticity whether in 
language or relationships, called such expressions the ‘received ideas’.1 In many 
instances, by the time the idea has reached one person, it has already been received by 
others, so reception never seems to be a problem. Undoubtedly, one of the best 
examples of such a received idea in current parlance is ‘governance’. In less than 
three decades, this word has re-emerged from its previously dormant status to be re-
thought and deployed across a range of domains and institutions, but often by actors 
who have different and contradictory ends. The term has been promoted as a central 
term of reference, either descriptively or normatively, and sometimes as both at once. 
‘Governances’ are now multiplying at a remarkable rate, and can be found in all types 
of institutional settings and forums, from school governance and church governance 
to health governance and environmental governance. In corporate mission statements 
and annual reports few other words appear as attractive or necessary. At the same 
time, permeating policy communities and academic research agendas are the two 
major derivatives: global governance and good governance. In short, governance has 
become a remarkably accessible and flexible word. Indeed, it has become so flexible 
that different actors have been able to ‘empty into’ the term their own meanings and 
visions, from business executives wanting to secure intellectual property rights to 
charity workers wanting respect for human rights. 
 
At first glance, one may query why another conceptual dissection of governance is 
needed. A considerable amount of ink in both the social sciences and the policy world 
has already been spilt on trying to isolate the meaning of this pervasive term. 
Nonetheless, despite the apparent intuitive appeal of the concept, this article argues 
that governance contains some very contentious social and political histories. The 
‘comet-like’ rise of the notion is interesting not simply on etymological grounds, but 
also for how uses of the word illuminate larger struggles over the relationship 
between language and power in political life.2 However, in this article, I argue that 
part of the conceptual problem with governance lies in how its specific ideological 
relationship to capitalism has been underspecified. This is not to suggest, in any kind 
of crude sense, that the term has not been used to shed light on many political 
economy questions surrounding, for instance, the organisation of capitalist 
democracies or the world economy. Nor am I implying that all applications of the 
expression – academic or policy – are somehow intentionally infused with business 
motivations, that is, viewing ideology in the classic Marxist sense as a ‘cloaking’ 
device to obscure material interests. Rather, my aim here is empirically restricted to 
further problematising and, importantly, historicising the early genealogy of 
governance as a policy term. I suggest that understanding this history is best captured 
through a conceptual framework that is alert to the relationship between political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Gustave Flaubert, The Dictionary of Accepted Ideas (New York: New Directions, 1968). The book 
was originally published posthumously in 1913. 
2 Claus Offe, ‘Governance: An “Empty Signifier”?’, Constellations, 16 (2009), 4, 550-562, quoted at 
550. 
 3 
forces, social critique, and debates that are used to explain and, significantly, 
constitute, particular forms of capitalism. 
 
My argument is organised into four sections. First, I provide an initial justification for 
the ambitions of the article, including attention to how governance has been 
commonly interpreted with reference to political economy issues. I also explain how 
my proposition that the concept can be read as an ideological expression of capitalist 
practice is shared by other writers. Second, the article explains the analytical 
framework that will be used for critically examining governance. Here, I draw upon 
the work of the sociologists Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, who have constructed a 
sophisticated argument around explaining how ideological practices associated with 
neoliberalism form part of the latest ‘spirit of capitalism’.3 I briefly outline what 
constitutes this spirit and, in particular, stress how capitalism always requires 
arguments that answer, or appear to answer, enduring questions of security and 
justice. The third and fourth sections form the empirical tracing of the concept which 
is, in large part, a US-based story. The argument begins by situating the emergence of 
the term in the 1970s in light of the broader crisis of governability. Through a novel 
comparison between the formation of ‘corporate governance’ and, by the 1980s, the 
appropriation of a ‘governance agenda’ by the World Bank, my argument aims to 
elucidate how this term, within certain policy uses, can reflect and help legitimise a 
neoliberal spirit of capitalism. Thus, the paper considers how the word could be 
considered a fruitful entrée into analysing a number of core political enquires, 
including macro shifts in the evolution of the economy, the management of social 
critique and, in general, methods of legitimation deployed within power relations.  
 
 
I. ‘GOVERNANCE’ AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
Within political science, public policy, and international relations, there remains 
considerable debate over what phenomena should be classified under the heading of 
governance and how the term enhances our understanding of the political world.4 
Indeed, for some, the very ubiquity and ‘stretching’ of the concept risks devaluing 
whatever utility it might potentially hold.5 As Guy Peters has put it, ‘the real danger is 
that governance becomes meaningless and a tautology; something happened and 
therefore governance occurred’.6 Like to neoliberalism – another highly disputed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2007). 
4 For larger edited volumes and introductions of significance, see Mark Bevir (ed), The Sage Handbook 
of Governance (London: Sage, 2011); and Mark Bevir (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Governance, 2 vol 
(London: Sage, 2006); as well as David Levi-Faur, The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); and Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 2004). For 
some major accounts that have informed debates, see in particular, Rod Rhodes, Understanding 
Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity, and Accountability (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1997); Gerry Stoker, ‘Governance as Theory: Five Propositions’, International Social 
Science Journal, 50, 155 (1998), 17-28; and Kees Van Kersbergen and Frans Van Waarden, 
‘“Governance” as a Bridge Between Disciplines: Cross-disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in 
Governance and Problems of Governability, Accountability and Legitimacy’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 43 (2004), 2, 143-171. 
5 The notion of conceptual stretching is derived from Sartori Giovanni, ‘Concept Misformation in 
Comparative Politics’, American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 4, 1033-1053. 
6 Guy Peters, ‘Globalization, Institutions, and Governance’, in Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie (eds), 
Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Revitalizing the Public Service (Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2000), 35. 
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notion – governance is a kind of ‘rascal concept’, ‘promiscuously pervasive, yet 
inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested’.7 As a 
baseline, the term continues to be compared to government, either as an alternative or 
complementary conceptual lens. Stemming from this initial position, authors and 
policymakers who invoke governance often claim that authority today does not only 
reside with the Leviathan but, instead, is diffused among a variety of actors, operating 
across a range of social levels and spaces. Analysts have subsequently argued how 
arrangements called ‘governance’ help to account for a ‘fragmented and 
multidimensional order within the state, by the state, without the state, and beyond the 
state’.8 In particular, the term often appears as a way to explain major shifts in the 
location or form of politics, such as from the state to markets, from politicians to 
experts, or from the national to the global.9 In this sense, uses of the expression tend 
to swing between two poles: governance as process (the steering of policymaking) 
and governance as structure (the institutions of rule). 
 
The popularity of governance undoubtedly stems from how it appears as a zeitgeist; a 
modern term to encapsulate and, by implication, supposedly clarify the world. 
However, there is the risk of using the word as a crutch to lean on, rather than an idea 
to critically inspect, is that particular social histories associated with the concept – 
including those linked to capitalist processes – may be neglected. To argue for an 
understanding of governance as grounded in capitalist social relations is not, in itself, 
new. There is a series of research agendas, across several academic fields, which use 
governance as a framework to analyse the structures, processes and strategies of rule 
within capitalist democracies. For instance, in debates ignited by the claim that the 
(Western) state has been ‘hollowed out’ under the influence of big business, studies 
have examined the role of corporate actors in the management of public services, and 
the regulatory capture of particular state agencies and initiatives.10 In the international 
context, other writers are correct to note how the derivatives of ‘global governance’ 
and ‘good governance’ arose in the context of the post-Cold War period and the 
universalisation of a business-centred vision of political life.11 In these senses, 
therefore, authors have recognised that the discourse on the ‘new governance’, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, ‘Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, 
Modalities, Pathways’, Global Networks, 10 (2010), 2, 182-22, quoted at 184. 
8 David Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”, in Levi-Faur, The Oxford 
Handbook of Governance, 1, italics in original. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Rhodes, Understanding Governance, as well as a revision in Rod Rhodes, ‘Understanding 
Governance: Ten Years On’, Organization Studies, 28 (2007), 8, 1243-1264. For the counter-argument 
that governments have been ‘hollowed in’ to enhance their capacity, see Stephen Bell and Andrew 
Hindmoor, Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). Other ‘second wave’ accounts include Bob Jessop’s 
conceptualisation of ‘metagovernance’, that is, how the state is claimed to steer actors and networks 
within society who, subsequently, do much of the governing themselves, including implementing 
policies and providing public services. For a summary, see Bob Jessop, ‘Metagovernance’, in Bevir 
(ed), The Sage Handbook of Governance. 
11 For instance, see James N. Rosenau ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in James N. 
Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Governance, 
Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges’, Third World 
Quarterly, 21, 5 (2000), 795-814. Also see, Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds), NGOs, the 
UN, and Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); and Rodney Bruce Hall and 
Thomas J. Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
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particularly in some of its policy deployments, arose either to define or, more 
politically, to give credence to certain economic relations. 
 
My argument here is not directly focused on treading through these well-worn debates 
but, instead, seeks to sharpen the objectification of governance as a policy term in 
order to understand better how, within certain institutional contexts, it can be treated 
as an ideological expression of capitalist motivations. This argument shares some 
affinities with other critics who have also called for the term to be analysed through 
the prism of ideology.12 In particular, Jonathan Davies’ work has offered a sensitive 
Gramscian-inspired account of how the notion of governance is best grasped as a 
form of neoliberal ideology, particularly in discourses that stress networks as a 
normative goal of social and political organisation.13 In doing so, Davies calls for a 
different understanding of governance, one that more deftly probes dimensions of 
power, including coercive acts, rather than assuming that, politics under the ideal type 
model of ‘network governance’, will be beneficial for all. Indeed, in a notable critical 
extension, his analysis seeks to unpick how ‘“networked” governance institutions 
look very much like the “modernist” hierarchies they were supposed to replace’.14 
Thus, ideological analysis has the potential to reveal not only the divergences between 
theoretical or prescriptive claims and the concrete experience of ‘governance’, but 
also how political power may be obfuscated through such vocabularies and who 
benefits from such processes. 
 
This effort to unravel the ideological properties of the concept of governance is best 
prosecuted through an empirical tracing of the idea. To uncover the genesis of 
governance does not imply that the meanings initially ascribed to the term remain 
rigidly set across all subsequent uses (although certain early traces may leave 
contemporary imprints). The point of a genealogical method is, rather, to guard 
against the risk of reifying certain concepts from their historical gestation and to 
reveal how seemingly innocent expressions emerge out of concrete and, often uneven, 
material struggles. The argument here does not deny that larger theoretical 
approaches, such as new public management and rational choice approaches, have 
informed different meanings of governance and, in turn, these have filtered into 
policymaking agendas.15 For instance, the term emerged in reaction to presumed 
analytical problems in the social sciences, particularly a rejection of overly strict 
dichotomies, such as public versus private or market versus hierarchy.16 My intention 
is not to offer some exhaustive discussion of these intellectual trends but, rather, to 
contextualise how the early policy experimentation with the term arose out of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 For example, see François-Xavier Merrien, ‘Governance and Modern Welfare States’, International 
Social Science Journal, 50, (1998), 155, 57-67; Will Leggett, ‘The Analytical and Political Limits to 
‘Interpreting’ Governance’, British Politics, 6 (2011), 2, 241-251; Massimo De Angelis, ‘The Political 
Economy of Global Neoliberal Governance’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 28 (2005), 3, 229-257; 
and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Governance: Between Myth and Reality’, Revista Crítica de 
Ciências Sociais Annual Review, no. 0, online since September 2009. This critique of governance as a 
term is also partly inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, ‘NewLiberalSpeak: Notes on the 
New Planetary Vulgate’, Radical Philosophy, January-February, 2001 (105), 2-5.  
13 Jonathan Davies, Challenging Governance Theory: From Networks to Hegemony (Bristol: The 
Policy Press, 2011). 
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Mark Bevir, Democratic Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
16 Bob Jessop, ‘The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic 
Development’, International Social Science Journal, 50 (1998), 155, 29-45. 
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particular problems in the legitimation of capitalist processes. The empirical focus is 
on revealing illustrations of how institutions tested the potential of the concept but, at 
the same time, I try to connect and explain such labour in relation to larger material 
and political forces. In doing so, the empirical stories help to clarify further how 
governance moved from being an arbitrary or curious expression to something that 
was considered politically valuable in the management of power.  
 
 
II.  PROPERTIES OF THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
 
Capitalism has historically required reasons for encouraging people to commit to 
accumulation processes that, in many cases, may be uninspiring, unpleasant or even 
dangerous. In Marxist and Gramscian analysis, ideology has served as the major 
conceptual lens to analyse such practices, often depicted as an elite-led ‘veiling’ 
instrument which aims to secure the legitimation of an established order. From this 
perspective, the emphasis is placed on how methods of legitimation are used by 
capitalists and state officials to maintain particular social relations and how conflict is 
minimized or ‘masked’ through seemingly consensual means.17 The Marxist study of 
ideology has long been associated with questions of truth and falsehood, in particular, 
the impediments (both deliberate and unintentional) that are placed in the pathway of 
recognising or realising truth.18 Other major theorists have also addressed similar 
themes. For instance, borrowing from Marx and Parsons, Habermas argues that 
legitimacy is a kind of façade or screen which is necessary for a stable social order, 
particularly in terms of managing the tensions between capitalism and democracy.19 
Likewise, Bourdieu, inspired by Weber, developed the notion of symbolic power to 
explore how the normalisation of authority, including economic agendas, can become 
absorbed into the cognitive frameworks of both the dominant and the dominated.20  
 
The larger conceptual framework in this article stems from these long-standing 
enquiries. A specific inspiration here comes from Boltanski and Chiapello’s The New 
Spirit of Capitalism (2007), a work which dissects a series of French management 
texts in order to elucidate the processes through which neoliberalism, conceived as the 
current stage of capitalism, has sustained itself through the selective distortion of 
social critiques derived from the 1960s and 1970s.21 The title of the book is a nod to 
the classic Weberian proposition that capitalism requires a particular ‘spirit’, or set of 
ideological practices, in order to inspire and motivate capitalists. Their conception of 
ideology – which I share – is important to clarify. Boltanski and Chiapello depart 
from the reductionist Marxist sense of the ‘dominant ideology’, a presumed coherent 
‘system’ engineered by Machiavellian elites in order to conceal material interests. 
Instead, ideology is theorised as a practical set of relatively stable schemas, grounded 
in lived experiences, and cultivated by many players including, but also beyond, a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970); and 
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). 
18 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
19 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). 
20 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); and The Social 
Structures of the Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). 
21 Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism. The book draws upon some earlier 
arguments contained in Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 7 
privileged elite. When effectively sedimented and reproduced within institutions and 
mental structures, these beliefs offer agents stimuli to action, depending upon how the 
actual justification for action corresponds with the internal dispositions acquired 
through history.  
 
Among the many interesting arguments developed by Boltanski and Chiapello, they 
underscore how each ethos of capitalism works not only to stimulate new strategies of 
profit generation, but also contains ideas that, in part, constrain accumulation 
processes.22 Indeed, they propose that the degree to which the system is legitimised is 
intimately associated with how constraints are imposed on capitalist behaviour.23 
Again, in this sense, Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument runs counter to the cruder 
Marxist depiction of ideology as some imposing regime and, instead, proposes that 
critique serves as a major ‘motor of change’ in capitalism.24 In some cases, this 
relationship between critique and capitalism can have a relatively clear causal 
connection, such as a street protest that generates a government policy change. At 
other times, however, the ties between critique and capitalism are labyrinthine and 
unstable, particularly if the relations cross time and territories. Overall, they argue that 
critique is important to study for at least two reasons: not only does it confront 
capitalism with troubling ethical questions but also, through a period of reflection, 
experimentation and potential incorporation, critique may inadvertently ‘give’ new 
ideological resources to reinvigorate capitalism (or, rather, capitalism ‘captures’ and 
claims new ideas for itself).25  
 
A key analytical problem for Boltanski and Chiapello is to explain how each spirit of 
capitalism becomes concretised into organisational practices that guide social actors 
and provide a sense of meaning to their working lives. Organised theoretical bodies, 
as found within neoclassical economics for instance, offer a set of stable ideas for 
modelling capitalism, but they remain too abstract for motivating most workers, 
including even professionals educated in economic science. To complement such 
intellectual resources, they suggest that three practical ideological dimensions play an 
important role. First, capitalism has to offer forms of security for those who are 
involved in the business of commodification, both for the present and next generation. 
In the previous spirit of capitalism, which ran from the 1940s to 1970s, security was 
founded upon large hierarchical firms that offered a degree of job protection and 
predictable career pathways. Within advanced industrial societies, meanings of 
security were also shaped by the growth of the welfare state which constructed new 
safety nets for less privileged groups. In the neoliberal spirit of capitalism, Boltanski 
and Chiapello argue that security has been redefined to benefit those who are mobile 
and able to self-manage (the ‘entrepreneurial’ desire). What is rejected in the current 
spirit are authoritarian methods of management, excessive bureaucracy, and the 
separation between one’s private and professional lives. 
 
A second set of arguments surround the idea of fairness. In opposition to some 
theorists who separate capitalism from morality or suppress questions of justice, 
Boltanski and Chiapello underscore how the legitimation of the system is predicated 
upon complex appeals to the common good and a sense of community. In the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, for instance, 24-27. 
23 Ibid., xx. 
24 Ibid., xx-xxi. 
25 Ibid., for instance, 27-30. 
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neoliberal workplace, the fairness dimension is often paired with a security argument: 
new forms of meritocracy stress the potential to develop one’s own ‘vision’ through 
social networks and flexible project management. Again, hierarchical modes of rule, 
through which orders are dictated by a single boss, are considered passé and 
incompatible with modern business practices. According to this framework, 
organisations are supposed to be transparent in their communications and capable of 
negotiating with different societal actors, including those who are presumed to be 
confrontational, a practice codified through the expansion of corporate social 
responsibility. A third dimension of the spirit of capitalism is how it appeals to 
emotionally exciting activities, a quality which has become significant in light of the 
expansion in consumerism over the post-war period. The arguments offered here tend 
to revolve around notions of liberation, with particular appeals to innovation and 
creativity as sought-after drivers of capitalist growth.26 
 
Through two pertinent empirical stories below, my argument situates the conceptual 
birth of governance in light of the unsteady development of a broader neoliberal spirit 
of capitalism. Specific attention is directed to explaining how the legitimation of the 
concept can be understood through arguments that have some deeper rationale linked 
to principles of security or fairness (the emotion of excitement being less relevant for 
this particular concept). These principles do not always need to be clearly articulated 
and reasoned; indeed, it is often politically useful for lines of responsibility to remain 
blurred and ambiguous. To underscore again, this explanatory exercise is not meant to 
encapsulate some ‘essential truth’ of governance that can be applied to all social 
environments. While my argument does aim to illuminate how governance now 
occupies a central place in the vocabulary of neoliberalism, this does not imply that 
the term is only used in contexts that have some appeal to commodification 
processes.27 By arguing that governance is part of a particular vocabulary, I am also 
trying to explain how this difficult term is situated in a conceptual organising grid; 
that is, how the vague and often confusing meanings of the word only make sense in 
relation to other ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ notions within a larger body of thought, such 
as ‘partnership’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘network’.28 At the same time, one also needs to 
appreciate that discrepancies may exist between, on the one hand, abstract aspirations 
for a neoliberal spirit and, on the other, how material relations are concretely realised 
in particular social and spatial settings. What could be called the ‘operative ideology’ 
of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ – the ideas that are embedded into organisational 
rules, codes, and behavioural practices – may only be a partial or distorted realisation 
of some ‘theoretical ideology’ of neoliberalism.29  
 
 
III. THE CORPORATE ROOTS OF ‘GOVERNANCE’ 
 
Despite its modern appearance, governance is actually a very old term which has long 
been associated with discipline and the action or manner of governing. This history of 
the concept, dating back to medieval usages, is not the centre of attention in this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., for instance, 12-16. 
27 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 
28 The metaphors of core and periphery in this context are derived from Freeden, Ideologies and 
Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. 
29 Loïc Wacquant, ‘Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism’, 
Social Anthropology, 20 (2012), 1, 66-79. 
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paper. But it is interesting to note how some authors who have struggled with the term 
have reached for their dictionary to draw upon these older senses. One finds that 
governance entered English in the fourteenth century (derived from the French 
governaunce) and was used by Chaucer in reference to both political and personal 
affairs.30 The word could refer to the rule over a territory or the command of a 
military force, particularly in nautical contexts, to define practices of steering and 
directing (from the Latin guberno). At the same time, governance also meant general 
administrative control, not confined therefore to states but also applied to control 
within the household.31 Thus, the expression appears to have an initial origin in 
changing expectations of human behaviour and, in particular, the idea of being 
condemned if a person did not reach some ideal standard of comportment.32 
 
Some of these meanings that were attached to the term have not been lost in its recent 
usage. Indeed, the sense of governance as being about steering and directing has been 
applied to contemporary contexts. For instance, thinking of the nautical history, one 
can note how some authors who use the term argue for governments ‘to steer’ the 
macro forces of society and leave other actors, including business players, ‘to row’.33 
However, when one advances the analytical focus to the twentieth century, where are 
the political and social seeds of its explicit revival and re-reading? I would suggest, in 
the first instance, that governance was retrieved not in the immediate context of the 
post-Cold War period, nor in reaction to some codified neoliberal revolution in 
policymaking from above which accelerated during the 1990s. Rather, I argue here 
that the term emerges in light of the perceived crisis of governability within Western 
societies during the 1970s or, to locate it more specifically, the ‘Anglophone 
heartland’.34 This early context is grasped by some authors, such as Mark Bevir’s 
attention to the strains experienced by forms of bureaucratic rule associated with the 
Westminster model of politics.35 What is still lacking, however, is a more studied 
exploration of the initial experimentation with the precise term ‘governance’ and how, 
in particular, its uses are informed by broader trends in the culture of capitalism. 
 
According to some observers at this time, the economic and cultural changes of the 
1970s – from stagnation and oil crises to the fallout from Vietnam and Watergate – 
were leading to conditions of ‘political bankruptcy’.36 Within the US in particular, 
there were fears by many astute defenders of the market system that social cohesion 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, C.T. Onions (ed), (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1933); and Christopher Cannon, The Making of Chaucer’s English: A Study of Words 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
31 Middle English Dictionary (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), last updated December 18, 
2001, http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/med. 
32 Barbara A. Hanawalt, ‘“Good Governance” in the Medieval and Early Modern Context’, The 
Journal of British Studies, 37 (1998), 3, 246-257. 
33 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (Reading: MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992). 
34 Kees van der Pijl, ‘A Lockean Europe?’, New Left Review, 37, January-February, 2006. Until the 
1970s, the word does not appear to have been very popular. For instance, in a search of publications at 
the British Library for the period 1900-1969, only 41 items return ‘governance’ in the title. Indeed, in 
one edition of the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (Edinburgh: Chambers, 1972), the 
expression was defined as obsolete. 
35 Bevir, Democratic Governance. 
36 Richard Rose and Guy Peters, Can Government Go Bankrupt? (London: Macmillan, 1978). In 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ article, ‘Governance: Between Myth and Reality’, this same historical 
context is also recounted to explain the rise of the term. 
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was fragmenting. A report by the Trilateral Commission in 1975 provides an 
illuminating (and somewhat paranoid) insight into the mind of conservative 
thinking.37 According to Commissioner Samuel P. Huntington and his associates, 
certain modes of government were giving rise ‘to forces and tendencies which, if 
unchecked by some outside agency, will eventually lead to the undermining of 
democracy’. They concluded that the ‘democratic surge’ was to blame for generating 
‘a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a de-legitimation of political and 
other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its 
capacity to respond’.38 Even in that conservative Western club, the OECD in Paris, 
employment experts were speculating about the trajectory of social unrest. Some 
actually used the term ‘revolution’ to describe what they thought was (or could be) 
going on outside their offices on the streets. They complained repeatedly about a 
‘general challenge to authority’.39  
 
It is in this volatile environment, complete with a range of social and political 
demands, that the word governance reappears. Initially, the first people who began 
thinking about the term and elaborating upon its meaning were those who were 
confronting a legitimacy deficit in a vital institution: the American corporation. The 
attachment of ‘corporate’ to ‘governance’ was a response to different forces and 
trends, but of chief significance were ‘consumer-orientated politics’, demands for 
increased shareholder power, and open business reporting.40 The behaviour of leading 
managers intersected with all these concerns. It is important to recall that during this 
period the public image of the US corporation was greatly damaged as a result of 
revelations of executive misbehaviour and unruliness, investigated with particular 
zeal by Ralph Nader and his contemporaries (the closest activists referred to as 
‘Nader’s Raiders’).41 Consumer safety concerns at General Motors were one 
prominent example. Other criticisms surrounded reports of illicit payments made by 
US firms to foreign government officials, notably the Lockheed bribery scandal that 
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led to considerable political controversy and almost destroyed the company.42 
Through the establishment of Public Citizen, his consumer rights advocacy group, 
Nader secured a prominent platform to promote his vision of the federal chartering of 
US companies.43 In short, the wider crisis of governability was bound up with a 
particular corporate legitimation problem. 
 
In an article which reinforces my argument, William Ocasio and John Joseph propose 
that Nader deserves primary credit for promoting an analogy between the governance 
of democracy and the governance of the corporation.44 By 1976, encouraged by 
Nader’s corporate accountability studies, the US Senate Committee on Commerce 
hosted a set of hearings on ‘Corporate Rights and Responsibilities’. The term 
‘governance’ was invoked in one session by Richard M. Cyert, then Dean of Carnegie 
Mellon University, who used it to comment on the relationship between chief 
executive officers, corporate boards, and shareholders. By the end of 1976, in the 
Federal Register, the US government journal, the phrase ‘corporate governance’ was 
used for the first time in an official document. The term was noted in connection with 
an emerging study being conducted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) which was to explore ‘shareholder participation in corporate governance and, 
more generally, shareholder democracy’.45 Elsewhere, by the late-1970s, in a series of 
symposiums, the American Law Institute (ALI) and the American Bar Association 
began to react to what was being called ‘the erosion doctrine’.46 Out of these meetings 
came the decision of the ALI to establish an initiative which would investigate what 
‘corporate governance’ actually meant and how it could be legally defined.47 Initially 
viewed as controversial by some, the ALI Corporate Governance Project was born to 
address this erosion of legitimacy, in particular to control those insatiable managers 
who were straying too far from some ideal behavioural model. As the 1980s unfolded, 
the corporate governance literature flourished. Every top firm dispatched their leading 
counsel to the annual meetings of the ALI in order to shape the new meanings of the 
term. By uttering the word ‘governance’ one could show to others – both critics and 
sympathisers – that one was being proactive in acknowledging the need for ‘business 
reforms’ or, just simply, ‘reforms’. 
 
Not unlike other later periods when corporate scandals were politically hot, such as 
around the collapse of Enron in 2001 and the fallout from the present banking crisis, I 
would argue that the word governance became intuitively useful because it implied 
that the American firm needed closer surveillance and discipline. The vagueness of 
the expression did not detract from its social value, particularly in terms of 
communicating with multiple audiences. Indeed, like any good frame, it offered a 
flexible mental short-cut that could be used to distil information, shape 
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understandings on problems and, in keeping with my general argument here, 
encourage action.48 At a deeper, almost pre-reflexive level, the agenda under 
corporate governance ‘made sense’ in relation to the enduring normative demands for 
fairness and security in the justification of capitalism. The watchword of governance 
enabled an organisation of debates for the purpose of reining in corporate abuses. At 
the very least, the appeal to corporate governance highlighted the question of elite 
power and responsibility for perceived injustices (to whom and under what conditions 
remained unclear). Importantly, this corporate governance agenda was inspired by an 
external critique and, thus, offers an empirical illustration of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s larger argument that the emerging neoliberal spirit in the 1970s and 1980s 
‘looked outside’ core capitalist institutions for inspiration on how not only to enable 
new accumulation processes but also constrain excessive business practices that were 
jeopardising the broader legitimation of capitalism.  
 
 
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL DISSEMINATION OF ‘GOVERNANCE’  
 
By the 1980s, the word governance began to spread from the corporate arena to the 
broader political field. These processes of diffusion and appropriation are difficult to 
map and tend to resist easy summation. However, one can elaborate upon one 
particular conceptual articulation of governance which has proved significant, not 
least because it had transnational implications. It centres on how the World Bank – an 
institution historically sensitive to domestic political debates in Washington D.C. – 
theoretically grappled with the notion. Like the refining of the term in corporate law 
and management theory, the idea of governance came to the Bank in response to a 
critique. The roots of the concept are found, in the first place, with the early resistance 
to the implementation of policies associated with neoliberalism in Southern countries. 
In this sense, we move from the original conditions which inspired the use of the term 
– the crisis of governability – to a second source: the resistance to the neoliberal 
counter-revolution that was, in part, inspired by the 1970s crisis. As with the genesis 
of the corporate governance discourse, I highlight the value of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s interpretation of the links between critique, justificatory terms, and new 
strategies of capitalist accumulation. 
 
The World Bank is a relatively transparent site of legitimation in the ‘international 
development industry’. Broadly speaking, the institution is tasked with organising 
ideas on the meaning and practice of development, as well as dispersing a variety of 
loans, credits and grants to Southern countries.49 The Bank was an early adopter of 
the term governance and, as a consequence of its dominant institutional position, has 
strongly informed how the expression has been understood, both in the development 
policy world and the academy. The concept was born out of criticism of structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) pursued in many African and Latin American countries. 
In the early 1980s, SAPs were ostensibly introduced by the Bank, in cooperation with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to meet the problem of the third world debt 
crisis. In return for emergency loans, a common SAP formula would include general 
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cuts to state expenditure, devaluation of the currency, increased trade liberalisation at 
the border, and privatisation of state agencies. Yet, as even a cursory glance of the 
results of these programs illustrated, no economic project (conceptually bracketed as 
‘divorced’ from politics) was likely to be sustainable unless minimum conditions of 
state legitimacy, social order, and institutional capacity were present.50 The critics – to 
be found within Southern government ministries, on the streets of major cities and, a 
little later, within the Northern academy and civil society groups – began arguing that 
the state had been unnecessarily ‘hollowed out’, that this impeded the development 
process, and that such conditions were caused by Bank policy prescriptions. The 
economy was embedded in society, they claimed, not the other way around. Above 
all, these critics argued that the Bank advanced such dictates in a top-down fashion 
that left little room for government agency.51 
 
In this context, the 1989 Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth, should be read as an ‘official’ reaction to this growing legitimacy problem. 
For the first time in a public document, the word governance was mentioned, in 
relation to a ‘crisis’ which was linked to the ‘litany of Africa’s development 
problems’.52 Shrouded in orthodox commonplaces, it was difficult to decipher if the 
Bank believed that its own actions had in any way caused or perpetuated such 
problems.53 But the report’s authors were adamant on one matter: ‘political legitimacy 
and consensus’ were not after-thoughts in the process of sustainable development, but 
‘preconditions’. What was needed in the space of Sub-Saharan Africa, they argued, 
was ‘political renewal’ and the creation of a ‘pluralistic institutional structure’.54 In 
short, governance was defined in this context as ‘the exercise of political power’.55 
But how did this talk fit with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement which officially 
forbid it from ‘doing politics’? At this point, the Bank did not have any easy or 
predictable answers because it had yet to clarify conceptually the term in its own 
institutional (hydra) head. Thus, if governance was to become a new received idea, 
the most sensitive experts knew that it would be wise to check with the lawyers first. 
 
In this regard, the Bank’s General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, played a very important 
role in expounding and codifying what governance could entail. In a long and 
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carefully justified statement to the Executive Directors in 1991, he argued that 
‘“governance,” in the sense of good order and discipline in the management of a 
country’s resources, is a relevant matter for the Bank’s activities’.56 But clarification 
was certainly needed, as Shihata expressed it, above all because ‘perceptions, coupled 
at times with vague statements, within and outside the Bank, have tended to give the 
impression that all issues of governance in borrowing countries may have become 
part and parcel of the Bank’s concern, if not its direct business’.57 As a consequence, 
his initial formulation was still very tentative when compared to where the Bank 
would later take the term. Shihata argued that governance was being studied and 
shaped if it involved areas such as civil service, legal and administrative ‘reform’, as 
long as such programs could be linked to ‘economic development’, the Bank’s core 
remit. The notion was helpful at this point in terms of managing the tense (and 
supposedly dichotomous) relationship between what was called ‘economic’ affairs 
and what was considered the domain of ‘politics’. Thus, to put it another way, one 
could argue that Shihata, as the Bank’s ‘chief consecrator’, was searching for the 
means to build the symbolic power of governance (to make it a recognisable 
‘universal’ term), but this could only begin by drawing upon the existing legitimacy 
found in the Bank’s older categories, classifications, and missions.58  
 
Following this reshaping of what was deemed legitimate, however, other analysts had 
a freer hand to evaluate and re-evaluate the term.59 Very quickly, many of these 
experts sensed how governance could be extremely valuable, both ‘discursively and 
programmatically’.60 With the Cold War over, the word began to spread rapidly as a 
‘planetary vulgate’; its original conditions of production and signification becoming 
further obfuscated.61 By 1996, under the direction of James Wolfensohn at the Bank, 
the term came to be associated with the rule of law, state effectiveness and, in 
particular, controlling corruption. Bt the turn of the century, another three 
‘dimensions’ had been added under the same rubric: voice and accountability, 
political stability and the absence of violence, and regulatory quality.62 In recent 
years, the Bank has settled on these six categories and has become keen to 
demonstrate that this nebulous concept – which is presently summarised as the 
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‘traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’ – can be 
ordered and refined.63 Promoting governance now means ‘[e]nabling the country to be 
in the driver’s seat’, a process that ‘requires strong partnership among the executive 
branch of government, other levels of government, the legislature, local authorities, 
civil society, the private sector, donors, international agencies, and other development 
actors’.64 Or, in another light, governance from the Bank’s position can (or should) be 
ambiguous, but not too ambiguous. To this end, the establishment of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators project, complete with country rankings on who is up and 
down in the ‘governance’ stakes, can be read as one of the organisation’s major 
symbolic tools for managing the flexibility found (and constructed) in the word.65 
 
At first glance, it might appear that Boltanski and Chiapello’s framework, formulated 
in the context of business management, would be less applicable for understanding 
the governance agenda of the Bank. However, I would suggest that their insights can, 
at a higher level of abstraction, also enlighten this story. First, social and political 
critique, emanating from different sources, was the initial motor of change that 
triggered a re-evaluation on how the Bank conceived and prosecuted lending policy in 
indebted countries. The appeal to governance – tentatively grasped at first, before 
expanding to embrace many other facets of state restructuring – could be defined as 
an effort to ‘tighten up’ the ‘tests of justification’ as Boltanski and Chiapello would 
express it (to improve the fairness of the test).66 For instance, one ‘test’ within this 
governance agenda has been how trade theory, previously articulated in a 
hubristically confident manner by Bank technicians in the 1980s, is now expressed 
more cautiously, especially in terms of the empirical linkages between industrial 
organisation, domestic institutions, and the so-called ‘sequencing of reforms’.67 In 
relation to this particular problem, the neoliberal spirit has now replenished its 
legitimacy, through countless policy and academic exchanges, both within and 
beyond the Bank, to incorporate a response to the original critique that external trade 
opening, without adequate conditions, was potentially damaging for such countries. In 
doing so, the test has been made ‘stricter’ in order ‘to make it more consonant with 
the model of justice that supports judgements claiming legitimacy’.68 Governance was 
a linchpin concept within a larger neoliberal vocabulary of ideas that assisted in this 
corrective legitimation process. 
 
Second, the Bank’s use of governance as a framing device, particularly around the 
‘good governance’ derivative in donor-recipient negotiations, appears to resonate with 
a more widespread desire for political concepts that emphasise partnerships and 
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networks over dictation and hierarchies. Admittedly, this point is captured by authors 
who have debated the notion of governance, but bears further inspection in light of 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s attention to business as a laboratory for rethinking how to 
control human subjects. As they argue, the spirit of neoliberalism repeatedly entices 
agents with a normative demand for individualised expression – ‘voice’ as typically 
invoked by the Bank – which is implicitly opposed to the presumed command-and-
control organisational practices in the previous spirit of capitalism. However, as a 
substantial critical literature has argued, power has not dissolved in fuzzy, post-
bureaucratic-inspired arrangements of ‘good governance’.69 On the contrary, forms of 
bureaucracy – hierarchical appraisal, acquiescence to authority, strict rules and codes, 
and intimidatory practices – have in many examples not gone anywhere, including at 
the Bank. Depending upon the empirical context, we may have a political form called 
‘governance’ which looks or is represented as post-bureaucratic, but may in reality to 
be nothing of the sort, or, alternatively, be something of a hybrid between 
bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy. In short, one should be alert to how the 
legitimation of agendas under the heading of ‘governance’, as with the Bank’s policy 
interventions, may in fact be encouraging or enabling more intense and sophisticated 
forms of control on the part of already privileged actors. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has been preoccupied with explaining the early genesis of the notion of 
governance in light of larger ideological changes in the culture of capitalism. 
Although the concept has been debated within different areas of the social sciences, 
understanding the term through this particular lens has been underexplored. By 
comparing the roots of corporate governance with the Bank’s experimentation with 
the term, we can draw some concluding remarks. Through applying the Boltanski and 
Chiapello framework, I have argued how the concept has been adapted to manage 
problems of legitimacy within relations of power. Thus, governance became a 
politically valuable word when arguments that constituted the spirit of capitalism – 
‘tests’ of its security and justice content in my illustrations – came under renewed 
scrutiny. The application of the term seems to imply that an entity or process is 
political, but not overtly political; that it is paradoxically all about power and yet not 
about power. Given this chameleon-like quality, it is not surprising that the expression 
has been seized upon by many professionals of politics who seek to evade, expand, or 
euphemise the ‘political’ content of their work. As a framing tool to organise agendas, 
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mobilise diverse agents, and offer some motivational cues, the term governance flits 
between the intuitive sense of hierarchical ordering (long tied to state rule) and the 
modern appeal to horizontal networking (expressed as established institutions of 
power who ‘consensually’ work with multiple agents on collective problems). 
Governance thus seems to be a kind of bridging concept between the bureaucratic and 
post-bureaucratic visions of politics, but normatively it is often used to privilege the 
latter as the presumed ‘high watermark’ of policymaking practice.  
 
Seen through this prism, I am not claiming, in a crude path-dependent manner, that all 
subsequent meanings and uses of governance from the 1990s have carried some 
‘taint’ of capitalism. The concept has now been remoulded and deployed within many 
contexts that do not have an explicit link to capitalist agendas. That I recognise. Yet 
the diffusion of the term into these other domains and intellectual agendas also 
indirectly works to further normalise those uses that are closest to capitalist initiatives. 
Equally, I am not suggesting that the term governance, within the given examples, 
magically ‘fixed’ problems of legitimacy. As suggested, one would need to dissect 
how this master concept is deriving its legitimating force from other notions in a 
larger neoliberal vocabulary (positively, as in terms like partnership; or negatively, as 
in the criticism of hierarchy).70 As noted, theoretical bodies, such as neoinstitutional 
economics and new public management or, more broadly, rationalist methodologies, 
often help to bolster the conceptual edifice called governance; this is an argument 
made by other scholars.71 The more limited purpose here was not to rehearse the 
content of these ‘governance theories’, but to uncover empirically how the expression 
entered into the language of two prominent institutional fields prior to its 
popularisation. By using ‘governance’ as a window to analyse larger forces, my 
argument has also revealed again, in the tradition initiated by Marx, how capitalism 
has a regenerative capacity not simply to withstand the roiling waves of social critique 
but to incorporate – often in a partial and distorted manner – elements of those 
critiques amenable to new accumulation practices. At the moment of creation, these 
processes can often appear unpredictable, before realising an apparent coherence over 
time. Thus, this argument has been about denaturalising the often ‘ahistorical’ appeal 
of governance in order to showcase how ideological analysis can reveal something of 
the constitution, and contestation over, capitalist relations of power.  
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